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Cigarette Taxes and Illicit Trade in Europe       
 
  
Highlights: 
• On average in Europe, countries with higher cigarette prices have less illicit retail trade in cigarettes 
(IRTC).  
• Notwithstanding, after controlling for income, increases in cigarette prices are associated with 
increased IRTC in pooled regression. 
• As determinants of IRTC, the corruption level of a country matters less than per capita income. 
• After controlling for country-specific unobserved factors, increases in cigarette prices remain 
associated with large increases in IRTC (whether measured by illicit shares or illicit volume). 
Abstract 
Cigarettes are highly taxed in Europe to discourage tobacco use and to fund public-health measures to 
mitigate the harms from tobacco consumption. At higher prices (more precisely, at higher differentials 
between licit and black-market prices) consumers substitute more toward illicit cigarettes. Illicit retail 
trade in cigarettes (IRTC) includes counterfeiting and smuggling—either of legally purchased products, 
from lower-tax to higher-tax jurisdictions, or of entirely non-tax-paid cigarettes. The existing literature 
includes claims that taxes are not an important factor determining the scale of IRTC. We investigate 
these claims with data from 1999–2013 in the European Union. We find that while the simple 
correlation between licit cigarette prices and the market share of illicit cigarettes in consumption is 
negative, raising prices in any one country would, on average, lead to substantial increases in the 
expected illicit market share and volume in that country. A one euro increase in tax per pack in a country 
is expected to increase illicit market share by 5 to 12 percentage points and increase illicit cigarette sales 
by 25% to 120% of the average consumption. We also find that the role of prices in stimulating IRTC is, 
empirically, far more important than the role of corruption. The results are robust to a host of 
alternative specifications and sources of data. 
JEL Codes:  I18, H26, K42, L66 
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I. Introduction 
Worldwide, trade in tobacco products is subject to an array of taxes and other controls. Taxes 
are intended to raise revenue (to fund public-health measures that mitigate the harms from tobacco 
consumption or other expenditures, or to reduce other taxes) and to discourage tobacco use (on both 
external-cost and paternalistic grounds). Not all taxes imposed are fully paid: efforts to avoid or evade 
paying taxes due include counterfeiting, theft and resale of not-yet taxed product, and smuggling—
either of legally purchased products, from lower-tax to higher-tax jurisdictions, or of entirely non-tax-
paid products. Estimates of the scope of the global illicit trade in tobacco products vary widely, as 
methodologies for estimating criminal activities are necessarily subject to considerable uncertainty and 
as many parties conducting such estimates have an interest in their size (Blecher, 2010). An estimate on 
the order of $40 billion in annual lost tax revenue globally is generally accepted (Joossens & Raw, 2008, 
2012). 
We focus here on estimating the relationship between taxes and illicit trade in cigarettes, which 
are by far the most popular form of tobacco. Although tobacco usage has fallen in recent decades, 
prevalence in European countries still ranges from about a quarter to a half of adults.1 The illicit retail 
trade in cigarettes (IRTC) is, by one widely used source of data, approximately ten percent of the global 
retail market (see Figure 1), with a strong upward trend in Western Europe. These shares vary 
considerably by country, varying from near zero to over one-half of all consumption in the data we 
introduce below. Illicit trade in Europe takes several forms, listed in order of prevalence:2 contraband 
                                                          
1 Data for the EU from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2008 to 2013, show country-
level rates for last-month prevalence of tobacco usage ranging from 24% to 47% among people 15-64 years of age. 
See emcdda.europa.eu/data/stats2015.  
2 Transcrime (2015) estimates average shares of the illicit cigarette market in 2013 for Europe to be 65% for 
contraband, 28% for cheap whites (see next footnote), and 7% for counterfeit.  
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genuine cigarettes smuggled in from lower price jurisdictions, whether by large-scale operators or by 
casual bootlegging by consumers; “cheap whites,” brands produced mainly for black market sales,3 and 
counterfeit product.4 In addition to the direct loss of tax revenue, other ills such as violence and funding 
for terrorism may be associated with IRTC (Prieger & Kulick, 2014, 2015; Center for the Study of 
Democracy, 2015; OECD, 2015; U.S. Department of State, 2015).5 In the EU, the illicit cigarette market 
was estimated to produce €10.5 billion in illicit revenue for criminals in 2012, which is comparable to the 
cocaine or heroin markets (Transcrime, 2015). 
The influence of taxes—and tax differentials with respect to other jurisdictions—on the 
variation in the extent and kind of IRTC is hotly disputed. How taxation affects IRTC is of more than 
academic interest; if cigarette tax-rate increases are determined, at least in part, by estimates of the 
anticipated decline in consumption due to higher prices, those estimates should account for the actual 
prices faced by consumers, which of course are composed in part by the lower prices of illicit cigarettes. 
While price differentials present a potential for profit from smuggling, the appeal of such tax evasion 
depends also on enforcement—the likelihood and consequences of being caught—and on other risks 
associated with criminal activity. 
Some analysts find that prices weigh heavily on the incidence of smuggling. According to Goel 
(2008, p. 591), in the United States “price inducements remain the main force behind smuggling” and 
                                                          
3 “Cheap whites” are cigarettes produced independently of the traditional tobacco manufacturers solely for the 
purpose of untaxed sales. As opposed to counterfeit product, cheap whites are sold under their own brands. (See 
Ross et al., 2015.) 
4 Counterfeit product is untaxed even if the consumer does not realize it, because some (but not all) counterfeit 
packs display counterfeit tax stamps and may be sold to unsuspecting consumers as licit product.  
5 A recent OECD (2015, ch.5) report contains excellent discussion of past and present documented links between 
illicit tobacco trade and financing of terrorism, and mentions that “[a]cademics have documented connections 
between cigarette smuggling in general and to specific terrorist organisations, such as AQIM, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA), PKK, RIRA and Hezbollah” (p.144). 
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nonprice influences (own or border corruption) are statistically insignificant. Others contend that prices 
matter little in determining the incidence of cigarette smuggling, particularly outside the United States. 
Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka (2000), looking at cross-sectional data across countries, find that 
“cigarette taxes that increase cigarette prices are only one, and probably not the most important factor 
in cigarette smuggling. The perceived level of corruption statistically explains more of the variance in 
experts’ estimates of cigarette smuggling than do cigarette prices” (p. 385). 
Joossens and his coauthors have made the most vigorous claims that prices only minimally 
affect IRTC and that other factors are more important. For example, Joossens et al. (2009) write, “higher 
income countries, where cigarettes are more expensive, have lower levels of cigarette smuggling than 
lower income countries. Other factors, including the presence of informal distribution networks, 
organized crime, industry participation, and corruption, probably contribute more to cigarette 
smuggling than price levels” (p. 17). Joossens is one of the most highly visible commentators in the 
tobacco-control policy arena, and these arguments are widely cited.6 These assertions, however, are 
counterintuitive; economic theory suggests that increasing taxes in one jurisdiction, which—all else 
equal—increases the potential profit from evading those taxes, should yield an increase in such evasion. 
Experience in a broad range of circumstances is consistent with this expectation, from agricultural goods 
(Norton, 1988) to diesel fuel (Marion & Muehlegger, 2008). Indeed, Webber and Wildavsky (1986) 
observe that tax evasion has been with us for as long as there have been taxes. Given the importance of 
the public-policy issue and the frequent repetition of these assertions minimizing the role of taxes in 
stimulating IRTC, these intriguing claims warrant careful consideration. 
In this paper we use a more complete set of panel data than the cross-sectional data used 
previously, to estimate the relative contributions of prices and other factors to the incidence of IRTC in 
                                                          
6 Joossens has authored or co-authored at least 32 publications since 1991 on tobacco and illicit trade, and these 
have over 1,600 citations per Google Scholar (as of yearend 2015). 
 4 
countries of the European Union in recent years. We find that higher licit prices for cigarettes within a 
country indeed spur more illicit trade, whether measured by illicit market share or quantity. Raising 
taxes within a single country by one euro per pack, and holding other things equal, is estimated to 
increase illicit market share by no less than 50% and perhaps more than 100%. That means increasing 
the quantities of illicit cigarettes consumed by 25%–120%. The main findings are corroborated by a host 
of alternative econometric specifications and data on illicit trade. 
II. Policy setting and literature review 
Joossens and his coauthors point out that higher income countries (which tend to have higher 
taxes and so more expensive cigarettes) tend to have lower levels of smuggling than lower income 
countries. We identify several principal claims in this literature. 
• Claim 1a: High cigarette prices are associated with low levels of IRTC. 
• Claim 1b: Raising cigarette taxes does not tend to increase IRTC. 
The quotation in the introduction from Joossens et al. (2009) is a typical example of Claim 1a. 
Elsewhere, Joossens et al. (2014) state that “our data show that illicit trade is not directly related to 
tobacco prices.” Claim 1a follows from the analysis of cross-country data. These authors then use Claim 
1a to imply or assert Claim 1b. The latter claim is either taken as self-evidently following from the former 
claim, or is part of a general dismissal of basic economics: “[C]igarette smuggling is not caused 
principally by ‘market forces’; it is supply driven, and caused mainly by fraud through the illegal evasion 
of taxes” (Joossens & Raw, 2003). These claims are not unique to Joossens, but also appear in the 
tobacco-control literature more generally regarding countries outside the United States. For example, a 
study by Abdolahinia et al. (2013) concludes that “…raising tobacco prices does not lead to increase in 
amount [sic] of smuggling” in Iran and another by Ajmal and U (2015, p. 116) finds that “tax increases … 
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have had a minimal impact on encouraging the use and procurement of illicit tobacco” in New Zealand. 
The studies that reach such conclusions tend to have inadequate controls for other factors, as we 
demonstrate below. We show that market forces in fact work exactly as predicted by microeconomic 
theory, after holding other things equal: the fraud and tax evasion occurs because greater price 
differentials between licit and illicit cigarettes cause some consumers to substitute toward the cheaper 
product.  
In other places in this literature, Claim 1b is softened; there the claim is that, while raising prices 
might theoretically increase IRTC, other factors predominate: 
• Claim 2: Corruption in a country is a more important determinant of IRTC than are taxes. 
For example, in Joossens et al. (2000, p .398): “Tax and price differentials among countries are not the 
only determinants of this type of smuggling, and may not be the most important…. Other factors that 
make large-scale cigarette smuggling more likely include corruption, public tolerance, informal 
distribution networks, widespread street-selling, and the presence of organized crime.”7 This 
formulation treats distribution networks, street-selling, and organized crime as exogenous factors 
instead of as endogenous reactions to the opportunities for profit created by the price differentials. 
Another argument in the tobacco-control literature is: 
• Claim 3: Examining IRTC in levels instead of as a share of total cigarette trade would lead 
to opposite conclusions about the impact of taxes on IRTC. 
                                                          
7 See also Joossens et al. (2009, p.2): “Other factors, including the presence of informal distribution networks, 
organized crime, industry participation, and corruption, probably contribute more to cigarette smuggling than 
price levels.”  
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This point has been made by Stoklosa (2015), who asserts that focusing on illicit-cigarette market share 
is “the tobacco industry’s misleading math trick.” The argument is that illicit market share can increase 
even as the actual number of illicit cigarettes smoked decreases. Thus an increase in taxes could, in 
theory, lead to both a higher illicit market share and a lower illicit level of consumption. Note that, for 
European cigarette markets, the basic patterns in illicit market share seen in Figure 1 carry over to illicit 
volumes as well (Figure 2). Thus, at least for Europe, we expect to find—and indeed do find—similar 
results when we change our dependent variable from illicit market share to illicit volume (see section 
IV.B.4). 
These claims are the focus of our analysis. We find support for Claim 1a but soundly reject the 
other claims. Evidence from other studies strongly suggests that, within the range of empirical 
experience, higher taxes bring in greater revenue despite their intended effect of decreasing smoking 
and their unintended effect of increasing smuggling (Chaloupka, Yurekli, & Fong, 2012).8 Our estimates 
are consistent with those results, but highlight that some potential tax revenue is lost to the illicit 
market.  
In contrast to the tobacco-control literature, studies by economists generally find the expected 
positive relationship between taxes and illicit trade. The theoretical link between taxation and smuggling 
was set forth by Norton (1988), who shows that the aggregate volume smuggled into a country is an 
increasing function of the tax rate. When the tax rate rises, existing smugglers substitute supply away 
from licit trade, and new smugglers located farther away from the border (and therefore with higher 
transport cost) find it profitable to enter the market. A large empirical literature based on data from 
North America finds that tobacco smuggling responds to prices as predicted (Baltagi & Levin, 1986; 
Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994; Saba et al., 1995; Galbraith & Kaiserman, 1997; Thursby & Thursby, 
                                                          
8 Higher taxes increase revenue if cigarette demand is inelastic, which is well established in the literature (see 
Gallet and List (2003) and the studies cited therein).  
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2000; Stehr, 2005; Chiou & Muehlegger, 2008; Goel, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008; DeCicca, Kenkel, & Liu, 
2013). In contrast, there is less work examining the multi-country European or worldwide markets, and 
much of the work is cross-sectional (Merriman, Yurekli, & Chaloupka, 2000; Yurekli & Sayginsoy, 2010). 
A recent review of the state of research regarding IRTC cites the econometric literature regarding the 
United States but, for Europe, references narrative and case studies only (van Walbeek et al, 2013). The 
present research helps fill this lacuna in the literature. 
III. Data on the cigarette industry and smuggling 
In this section we describe the data and summarize illicit trade, prices, taxes, and other market 
characteristics. 
A. Sources and construction of the data 
Countries included in the study are all those in the European Union except Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
and Malta, for which market data are unavailable. For countries joining the EU since 1999, only the years 
of membership are included (see Table 1 for a list of countries and years). Some calculations below 
involve prices in and distances to other countries outside the EU. Such related countries include all other 
countries in Europe for which market data were available (including Balkan countries, Turkey, and 
Russia). 
Data for the study span 1999 to 2013 and come from a variety of sources. Industry statistics 
come mainly from Euromonitor International’s Passport database, vintage June 2015. Euromonitor does 
not disclose exact methodology for its estimates of the illicit tobacco market, but says that it uses “on-
the-ground analysis” as well as “interview and secondary research including estimates made by 
governments (customs agencies, revenue departments, etc.), estimates based on seizures of illicit 
cigarettes, as well as by companies using other means of estimation, such as discarded, or empty pack 
surveys (EPS)” (Euromonitor, 2014b, p.3). Euromonitor also provides a list of sources consulted while 
 8 
developing each country’s estimates.9 Non-academic estimates of IRTC are sometimes attacked in the 
literature for being artificially high,10 and Euromonitor’s data on illicit tobacco have been questioned by 
some researchers (e.g., Blecher et al., 2015; van Walbeek & Shai, 2015), although usually not regarding 
Europe.11 Despite this, after an extensive search for alternative data we concur with Stoklosa (2015) of 
the American Cancer Society, who states: “Although there are some concerns around the reliability of 
Euromonitor illicit trade data, no other comparable global data exist” (p. 1). As a report for the European 
Commission (Pedersen et al., 2014) noted: “Due to the market’s contentious nature, various parties 
have vested interests in either deflating or inflating illicit trade figures, though Euromonitor strives to 
present the most accepted and realistic estimate of the market”(p. 39).12 We show below that the 
Euromonitor estimates of IRTC are highly correlated with data from an alternative source. 
                                                          
9 For example, five governmental sources are listed for the UK data (Eurostat, Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, HM Customs & Excise, HMRC - Statistics Illicit, and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)), five trade 
associations, eight publications from the trade press, 29 company sources, and five other sources. However, no 
one statistic in the data is linked to a particular source. 
10 In one of the few direct comparison of estimates from academic and industry sources, Stoklosa and Ross (2013) 
calculate that 15.6% of packs found in 2011 in Warsaw were not intended for the Polish market, compared to an 
industry estimate of 22.9% (the latter source was not Euromonitor). For comparison, the Euromonitor data 
estimate that 11.4% of cigarettes in Poland in 2011 were not duty-paid. 
11 These criticisms involve the estimates for South Africa, Mexico, Guatemala, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Bulgaria. Only the last of these is in our data. The main criticisms leveled against the Euromonitor data by tobacco-
control advocates is that the estimates are overstated and that there are instances in which the data for a country 
are revised retrospectively without explanation. From the evidence presented in Blecher et al. (2015) it appears 
that the form of the revisions is typically to adjust the level of the past trend without changing the shape of the 
trend much. To the extent that this is generally the case, our fixed-effect estimations below will remove any bias in 
the regression estimates caused by incorrect levels of the trends. 
12 The report further mentions that “Euromonitor’s business model depends on its provision of non-biased data 
that are as accurate as possible. The data have been used in previous reports for the European Commission and its 
Executive Agencies” (Ramboll, 2014, p.29). 
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Key variables from Euromonitor include the number of licit and illicit cigarettes traded in the 
retail market within each country, both in units of millions of sticks. Licit trade includes retail sales of 
duty-paid cigarettes, including legitimate sales for consumption in other countries, based on industry 
and governmental data. Illicit trade, measured with variable IllicitQty, includes all cigarettes for which 
duty has not been paid, and thus includes smuggled, gray-market,13 and counterfeit cigarettes and any 
produced domestically for black-market sales.14 Legitimate cross-border sales are excluded. From these 
two variables, our main dependent variable for the illicit trade share, IllicitMktShare, is calculated as the 
ratio of illicit retail-trade volume to total (licit plus illicit) retail-trade volume. To the extent that 
IllicitMktShare is mismeasured due to inaccurate estimates of the scale of the illicit market, there will be 
additional variance in the econometric errors terms in the regressions and therefore larger standard 
errors for the estimated coefficients. However, as long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with 
the regressors, it will not bias the coefficient estimates. 
Other industry variables include prices and taxes. Average licit cigarette price, CigPrice, is 
calculated as the total industry retail value of licit trade in cigarettes (from Euromonitor) divided by total 
licit retail-trade volume. The prices, as with all monetary variables in the dataset, are deflated to reflect 
the real price in 2010 euros per stick.15 Prices for illicit product are unavailable.16 Total excise taxes on a 
                                                          
13 Gray-market tobacco products are produced by a legitimate manufacturer for consumption in one jurisdiction, 
but somewhere along the supply chain (often in free-trade zones) are diverted to another jurisdiction, sometimes 
without the knowledge of the manufacturer. 
14 Cheap whites (see footnote 3) may be consumed in the country of production, in which case taxes for local 
consumption are normally paid and the sales do not count toward IllicitQty for that country. Cheap whites are 
often smuggled abroad, in which case they are part of the smuggled product counting toward IllicitQty in the 
receiving country (Joossens & Raw, 2012).  
15 The figures are originally denominated in current euros (using average exchange rates where needed), which are 
then deflated using the relevant country’s CPI (from the World Bank). 
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per-cigarette basis are in variable ExTax, which is calculated from data on specific excise taxes per stick 
(variable SpecTax), ad valorem excise taxes as a percentage of retail sales price (variable AVtax), and 
cigarette prices.17 Other tax-related variables are described in section IV.B.1 below.  
Other variables are used to control for potentially confounding factors related to illicit trade and 
consumption. Corruption is measured in various ways in the literature. In our main estimations, we use 
variable NotCorrupt, a measure of control of corruption from the World Bank.18 Higher values of this 
variable are associated with less corruption in a country. The measure “reflects perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain… as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011, p. 223). Unlike some measures of corruption, 
this measure is suitable for use in panel data because it is comparable across time. The income level of a 
country is measured with Gross National Income from the World Bank, converted to real €1,000.19 The 
names, definition, and sources of these and other variables to be introduced below are presented in 
Table 2. 
B. Summary of the market 
Summary statistics for the data are shown in Table 3. The illicit market share of cigarettes 
averages close to 10% and ranges in the EU over the years from virtually nil (0.4%, Italy in 2003) to over 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 Based on informal evidence, Transcrime (2015) assumes that illicit prices are two-thirds that of licit prices for 
comparable product. 
17 In the nomenclature of excise taxes, a specific tax is levied as a fixed monetary amount per unit, while an ad 
valorem tax comes from a tax rate applied to the pre-tax price of the good. 
18 Data are from The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014 Update, available from govindicators.org. A 
complete description of the data and methodology is available from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). Data 
are unavailable for 1999 and 2000 and are linearly interpolated from the surrounding years for all countries. 
19 GNI data from the World Bank (calculated using the Atlas method) are in current US dollars. The figures are 
deflated using the relevant country’s CPI (base year 2010, data also from the World Bank) and then converted to 
euros at that year’s average exchange rate (data from Euromonitor). 
 11 
half the market (53.8%, Latvia in 2010). Countries with more than 20% illicit market share for at least 
some years are Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the UK (the latter 
only in 2000 and 2001). The countries with less than 5% illicit market share in at least half of the years 
are Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Prices average 18.6 euro cents per cigarette, and range 
from 5.6 euro cents in Latvia upon first joining the EU20 to 46.4 euro cents in Ireland; prices are nearly as 
high in the UK. Excise taxes average about 11 euro cents; the same countries with the extreme prices 
have similarly extreme taxes. Corruption and income range widely across the EU. The Scandinavian 
countries, Finland, the Netherlands, and the UK have the highest values of NotCorrupt and GNIpc, while 
the Eastern European countries (particularly Bulgaria and Romania) have the lowest. Corruption and 
income do not move in lockstep: Greece has middling income but high levels of corruption, while 
Lithuania and Poland have low income but middling levels of corruption. 
As Joossens et al. (2009) and others rightly point out regarding Claim 1a, there is no obvious 
correlation between IRTC and taxes. Some countries have high prices and taxes and little illicit trade. To 
illustrate this point, prices and illicit market shares for EU countries in 2013 are plotted in Figure 3. 
Denmark and Sweden have relatively high prices and the lowest rates of IRTC. On the other hand, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have the highest levels of illicit market share, while having among the 
lowest prices in the EU. If anything, the relation between prices and IRTC appears to be mildly negative 
in the pooled data (at least for all but the highest prices), as the line of best fit for all observations 
shown in Figure 4 shows. 
Of course, correlation in the pooled data does not answer the key question for policymakers: If a 
country were to raise cigarette prices (by increasing the taxes) what would the impact be on IRTC? There 
are many confounding factors across countries and years, and those differences must be held constant 
                                                          
20 While EU regulations require heavy taxation of cigarettes, newly joining countries typically have a few years to 
phase in the higher taxes. 
 12 
to isolate the impact of prices on IRTC. Many of the potentially confounding factors, such as corruption, 
resources devoted to law enforcement, attitudes toward participation in black markets, and income vary 
much more across countries than over time. To illustrate the basic idea behind the fixed-effects 
econometrics approach below, consider what the data in Figure 4 look like when the country-specific 
time-averages of prices and IllicitMktShare are removed. The remaining within-country variation in 
prices and IRTC is untainted by any confounding factor that varies among countries (but not over time). 
The positive correlation is obvious in Figure 5 for the demeaned variables. While Figure 4 shows that the 
levels of prices and IRTC have little obvious relationship, Figure 5 indicates clearly that increases in 
cigarette prices are associated with increases in IRTC. While our main story is evident in Figure 5, 
additional regressions will be explored to control for possibly confounding factors that change over time 
as well as across countries, such as corruption, income, and factors making prices potentially 
endogenous. 
IV. Estimation 
The progression of this section is as follows. In section A, regressions using the pooled panel data are 
explored to show that the apparent negative correlation between prices and IRTC is due to omitted-
variables bias. The impacts of corruption, national income, and IRTC-relevant factors such as prices in 
neighboring countries are also explored. In section B, fixed-effects regressions using panel data are 
employed to control for unobserved differences among countries that may affect both prices and illicit 
activity. Results from a variety of regression specifications and methods, including instrumental 
variables regression, show that raising prices indeed leads to more illicit trade. In section C, the 
robustness of the conclusions is verified by exploring alternative measures of IRTC, prices, and taxes. 
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A. Pooled regressions 
1. Impact of licit price on illicit share 
We begin the econometric investigation of the link between cigarette taxes and IRTC with 
pooled OLS estimators. By pooling the data, unobserved differences among countries are ignored. 
Instead of examining taxes directly, in this section the key regressor is the log of real cigarette prices, 
under the assumption that consumers care about the total price of the product, not the composition of 
the price. In any event, taxes are the main driver of variation in prices: Figure 6 shows that most (93.1%) 
of the variation in real cigarette prices is explained by variation in taxes. The high correlation stems from 
the near one-to-one relationship between taxes and prices, as we document in the concluding section. 
(Whether taxes and prices affect IRTC differently is examined in section B.2 below.) The price regressor 
is in logs to reduce the impact of outliers due to the right-skewness of the distribution of prices in the 
sample. 
The simplest possible estimation is a regression of IRTC share on the log of real cigarette prices. 
This regression, the results of which are labeled OLS 4.1 in Table 4, calculates the line of best fit through 
the scatterplot of the data in Figure 4. The line of best fit by the least-squares criterion, as shown in 
Figure 4, has a slope of –0.05 that is not statistically significantly different from zero (p-value = 0.19). If 
the same regression is run for the 2013 cross sectional data, the estimate is about the same (–0.07) and 
similarly insignificant. Such cross-sectional or pooled regressions provide empirical support for Claim 1a, 
although in much of the tobacco-control literature the claim is supported with less than systematic 
evidence (e.g., case studies or purely graphical expositions). 
Claim 2, that corruption is a more important determinant of IRTC than are cigarette prices, is 
based on the observation that countries with less corruption and a stronger rule of law, such as the 
Scandinavian countries, have lower IRTC than more corrupt countries such as some of those in Eastern 
Europe (Merriman, Yurekli, and Chaloupka, 2000, Joossens et al., 2009). To formally investigate this 
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claim, the estimation OLS 4.2 in Table 4 adds regressor NotCorrupt. The coefficient on NotCorrupt is 
indeed negative and statistically significant while the price variable remains insignificant. Thus Claim 2. 
However, corruption is correlated with many other characteristics of the country that are omitted from 
the regression. In particular, NotCorrupt has 80% correlation with the country’s income level, GNIpc, 
which may greatly affect the IRTC share. If so, then the coefficients for price and NotCorrupt in 
estimation OLS 4.2 suffer from omitted variable bias. To test this, GNIpc in levels and squares is added in 
estimation OLS 4.3. The impact of income on IRTC share is negative, as to be expected in illicit product is 
an inferior good: wealthier countries experience less IRTC.21 More importantly, with income in the 
regression, the corruption variable loses significance and the impact of price on IRTC turns positive and 
significant. Regression OLS 4.3 provides evidence against Claims 1b and 2, even before correcting for the 
potential bias from unobserved differences among countries with panel regression or the potential 
endogeneity of prices. Despite the insignificance of the corruption measure, it is included in the 
regressions to follow given the importance ascribed to it in the literature as a proposed alternative 
driver of IRTC.  
2. Impact of IRTC-relevant factors in other countries 
Before turning to fixed-effects regressions, we also investigate factors in other countries that 
are expected to be correlated with IRTC in the home country. IRTC is an economic activity that depends 
not only on prices in the home country but also on other factors that affect the incentive for smugglers 
to import illicit cigarettes. Some such factors are the difference in prices of cigarettes between the home 
and other countries and the distance to countries with lower prices. If raising the price in the home 
country did not in fact have anything to do with increasing domestic IRTC, as asserted in Claim 1b, then 
                                                          
21 Globally, the impact of per capita income is U shaped, but the minimum of the U is far beyond the range of 
incomes in the sample, and so the marginal effect of income is negative across the sample. 
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after controlling for the domestic price, prices in and distances to other countries should have no effect 
(or only a negative impact) on the IRTC share.22 For example, as noted by Baltagi and Levin (1986), if 
taxes do not lead to bootlegging, then tax rates and prices in other places should not affect 
consumption. Variables such as distances to other countries do not vary over time, and so cannot be 
investigated once fixed effects are included in the model. Thus, these variables are explored in pooled 
estimations here. 
Many IRTC-relevant variables reflecting conditions outside the home country have been 
proposed in the literature (Baltagi & Levin, 1986; Becker, Grossman, & Murphy, 1994; Saba et al., 1995; 
Stehr, 2005; Thursby & Thursby, 2000; Merriman, Yurekli, & Chaloupka, 2000; Chiou & Muehlegger, 
2008; Goel, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008). Rather than arbitrarily choosing one of the available measures, we 
computed many possible measures to show that the regression results are generally similar regardless 
of which measures are included. The variables explored here are: 
1. LowPrDistEU: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest EU country with lower cigarette 
prices.23 EU countries are differentiated from other countries between this variable and 
the next because travel and transport of goods is easier within most of the EU, due to 
the lack of border control and free trade among states.24 Transcrime (2015) states that 
                                                          
22 Recall that IRTC measured here does not include legal nondomestic purchases (circumvention), so if lower prices 
in other countries spur addition legal circumvention, if anything more attractive conditions in the other countries 
would decrease the IRTC as a share of total legal sales. 
23 Distances for this and succeeding variables are calculated between the closest major cities (defined as having 
population greater than 500,000 or the largest in the country) in the pair of countries. LowPrDistEU is missing for 
the lowest-priced country within the EU each year. In all these variables, prices are always the real average price 
for the country and year as described above. 
24 Neither the free travel nor the free trade areas are the same as the EU country list, but there is a high degree of 
accord. The Schengen Area, in which there is no passport control, consists of 22 of the 28 EU members and Iceland, 
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the most frequent (but not the highest volume) illicit flows are characterized by 
geographic proximity. The top two such countries are Poland and the Netherlands. 
2. LowPrDistNonEU: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest country outside the EU with 
lower cigarette prices. For about half of the data, the closest such country is 
Switzerland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Algeria. 
3. CChubDist: The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest major hub for contraband and 
counterfeit (CC) cigarettes in Europe, where the three such areas are Russia, Turkey, and 
the Northeast Criminal Hub of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and the Russian exclave of 
Kaliningrad.25 Transcrime (2015) finds that the highest volume of illicit cigarette flows 
originate mainly from outside the EU, often entering through these hubs. 
4. MaxPdiff: The maximum difference in cigarette prices between the home country and 
contiguous countries (whether or not the other countries are in the EU). Contiguous 
countries are the easiest sources to access for bootlegging and casual smuggling. Cross-
border prices have been found to be associated with cigarette smuggling by Baltagi and 
Levin (1986), Saba et al. (1995), Thursby and Thursby (2000), Stehr (2005), Chiou and 
Muehlegger (2008), and Goel (2008). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The EU Customs Union, which requires free trade among members and a 
common external tariff, includes EU countries and Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Turkey. 
25 There are other areas of significant smuggling activity, for example in and through the Balkans, but the chosen 
three represent the outside-EU sources for most of the other areas. The product often reaches the Balkan 
countries from Turkey via Greece. Similarly, the significant smuggling routes through the Baltic states typically 
carry product produced in Kaliningrad and transferred via St. Petersburg in Russia to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
See Europol (2011) for details on the areas of criminal activity regarding cigarettes, from which we also take the 
term “Northeast Criminal Hub”. The only other significant source that report mentions is the UAE, but including 
UAE in the calculation of the variable CChubDist would not change the results because the other three areas are 
always closer. 
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5. MinPratio: The minimum over all contiguous countries of the ratio of the other 
country’s price to the home country’s price. 
6. MaxPdiffKM: The maximum price difference per km between the home country and any 
other European country in the dataset (whether or not the other countries are in the 
EU).  
If IllicitMktShare is a true measure of IRTC and Claim 1b is false, then in regressions we expect 
LowPrDistEU, LowPrDistNonEU, CChubDist, and MinPratio to have negative coefficients and MaxPdiff 
and MaxPdiffKM to have positive coefficients. The first regression results with these additional IRTC-
relevant variables are in Table 5, where the new regressors are added singly to the regression 
specification from estimation OLS 4.3. The coefficients all have the expected sign, although some are 
significant only at the 10% level. Further investigation of MaxPdiff revealed nonlinearities in its marginal 
effect on IRTC, and so in regression OLS 5.5 it enters the specification with a three-part linear spline.26 
Up to its median in the sample (a real price difference of 0.074€/stick, or 1.48€/pack, in licit prices), 
MaxPdiff has a positive, significant marginal effect on IRTC share. Between the median and the 90th 
percentile (0.16€/stick, or 3.15€/pack) there is no significant effect of price differences in contiguous 
countries on IRTC share. Beyond the 90th percentile, the marginal effect of MaxPdiff again turns positive, 
with significance at the 10% level. Note also that the own-country price effect is highly significant and 
about the same magnitude in all these regressions as in OLS 4.3.  
In the next set of regression results (Table 6), groups of other-country variables enter the 
regression at once. Since some of these variables are proxies for similar notions, it does not make sense 
                                                          
26 The knots were place at the median and 90th percentiles based on visual inspection of the partial fit resulting 
from a Generalized Additive Model estimation with specification like OLS 4.3 with the addition of MaxPdiff 
entering flexibly. 
 18 
to add all of them at once.27 Only one variable pertaining to the distance to a source outside the EU for 
illicit product (LowPrDistNonEU or CChubDist) is used in any one regression. Similarly, only one of the 
variables comparing the home country’s price with prices in its contiguous neighbors (MaxPdiff or 
MinPratio) enters any one specification. Examining all possible combinations among these choices yields 
the four regressions in Table 6. We show the results for all combinations of these variables to avoid the 
appearance of presenting only the strongest results. The most relevant statistic in Table 6, shown in the 
last row, is the p-value from the joint hypothesis test that the coefficients on all the included other-
country variables are zero. This is our omnibus test of whether these variables that are expected to 
impact IRTC indeed do so. In two of the regressions, OLS 3.1 and OLS 3.3, the hypothesis that these 
other-country variables have no impact on IRTC is rejected at better than the 1% level. In the other two, 
rejection is at the 5% level. The results of all these estimations and tests support the conclusion that 
higher licit prices and price differentials with other locations lead to higher illicit market shares due to 
smuggling and bootlegging. 
B. Fixed-effect panel regressions 
The results from estimation OLS 4.3 show that higher cigarette prices are indeed correlated with 
higher IRTC shares after accounting for differences in income levels. However, that simple regression 
does not address directly whether raising cigarette prices (by increasing the taxes) will increase IRTC 
(Claim 1b). Pooled regression does not account for the many ways in which countries differ apart from 
the factors controlled for in the regression, and some of those differences must be held constant to 
isolate the impact of prices on IRTC. Fixed-effect panel regressions allow us to control for unobserved 
country-specific factors that would otherwise bias the estimation. 
The fixed-effects model is: 
                                                          
27 Although if we do, the F-test for their joint significance has a p-value of 0.004. 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where the vector x consists of observed regressors including CigPrice, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an econometric error 
term representing idiosyncratic differences between the dependent variable and its mean conditional 
on the regressors. The fixed effect is 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, which varies across countries i but not over time. The great 
advantage of fixed-effects regression is that any country-specific factor, even those that are unobserved 
to the econometrician, are absorbed into the fixed effect. This is important because if such an 
unobserved factor “matters” (in the sense that it is correlated with illicit market share) and is also 
correlated with prices, then leaving it out of a regression would cause bias in the estimate of the price 
coefficient. The inclusion of the fixed effect into the model solves this problem. 
There are many country-specific unobserved factors that might be correlated with illicit market 
shares and cigarette prices. Attitudes about illegal behavior, enforcement against smuggling and illicit 
trade, and travel distances to major source of illicit supply are all examples. While each of these may 
change over time, much of the variation is likely to be between countries and not within a single 
country.  In such cases, fixed-effects regression removes the impact of differing country-level averages 
(i.e., the average over time within a country) on IRTC that would bias estimates from a cross-sectional or 
pooled regression. 
1. Illicit market share and cigarette prices 
Table 7 contains several regressions of the IRTC share on cigarette prices, all including country 
fixed effects. The first estimation, labeled FE 1, is identical to the specification of estimation OLS 1.3 but 
includes fixed effects. Correcting for omitted factors increases the magnitude of the price coefficient, 
which is significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of 0.164 in this linear-log regression means that a 
10% increase in the real cigarette price is associated with an increased illicit market share of 1.64 
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percentage points. The implied average price elasticity of illicit market share is about 3.4.28 There is no 
apparent impact of corruption, most likely because the income level is more important (as seen in 
estimation OLS 4.3) and because there is not a lot of variation in corruption within these countries over 
this period.29 
There may be trends across all countries that lead to spurious correlation between prices and 
IRTC even after controlling for unobserved country factors. For example, prices on average generally 
rose across the EU after 2004, as shown in Figure 7.30 The general trend for IRTC share (shown in the 
same figure) is upward during the entire period. If the latter is actually caused by factors other than 
rising prices, then the association between prices and IRTC may stem from spurious correlation of 
trending variables. Adding year fixed effects to control for such trends31 (estimation FE 2 in Table 7) 
changes the size of the price coefficient only slightly, although the p-value drops to 0.06. The implied 
average price elasticity of illicit market share in the sample is 3.3— a sizeable effect. 
Even after controlling for time- and country-specific omitted factors, the coefficient on the 
cigarette price might not reflect a causal impact on IRTC. In particular, there are three reasons why the 
price coefficient in the previous regressions is potentially downward biased. First, given that price is 
measured as average revenue, there is measurement error in this regressor. The actual price faced by 
                                                          
28 The price elasticity gives the percentage increase in illicit market share (not the change in percentage points, 
note) associated with a one percent increase in price. The elasticity is calculated as the sample average of 
𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙/𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖. 
29 The “between” standard deviation of NotCorrupt is 0.83, whereas the “within” s.d. is only 0.15. 
30 Average price in the EU fell between 2003 and 2004 due to the admittance of several Eastern European 
countries that had lower cigarette prices. The newly admitted countries were not required to immediately adhere 
to the EU minimums for tobacco excise taxes. 
31 Adding year fixed effects to the regression nonparametrically controls for trends, by effectively detrending the 
data by removing the yearly mean (across all countries) from each variable in the regression. 
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any one consumer in any single transaction will be unequal to the price variable used here.32 
Measurement error in a regressor leads to attenuation bias in its coefficient. Second, there may be 
unobserved factors varying by country and year that bias the price coefficient due to endogeneity. 
Because licit and illicit cigarettes are substitutes, an unobserved “shock” that increases demand for 
smuggled cigarettes may lower the equilibrium price of licit product. This would create an expected 
downward bias on the price coefficient. Third, it is theoretically possible (although not likely during the 
period examined)33 that there is reverse causality between illicit trade and tax rates if, for example, the 
tobacco industry uses rising IRTC to successfully lobby for lower taxes. This would also create spurious 
negative correlation between IRTC and prices and therefore downward bias in a positive price 
coefficient. However, taxes generally rose or stayed level in each country in our sample (as 
demonstrated in the appendix, section A) and it appears unlikely that reverse causality could materially 
affect the results.34 
To investigate endogeneity, we estimated a fixed-effects instrumental variables (IV) regression 
using general and excise tax instruments. The general tax instruments for cigarette prices employed 
here are LaborTax, the labor tax rate35 and VAT, the value-added tax (VAT) as a fraction of retail sales 
price. Both of these may be expected to be positively correlated with the retail prices of all goods, 
                                                          
32 Assuming the data on revenue and quantities are accurate, the price variable will be correct on average but not 
in specific for any given transaction. Such aggregation bias potentially afflicts most market-level demand 
estimations in the literature. 
33 Joossens et al. (2000) state that Canada and Sweden reduced their taxes in the 1990s on tobacco products 
because of concern about increased smuggling. Canada is not in our dataset and the tax reduction in Sweden is 
from 1998, predating our sample. 
34 The appendix also shows that when the few countries that lower taxes are dropped from the estimation, little 
changes in the results. 
35 The variable is the total revenue from taxes on employed labor income as a percentage of GDP. Taxes included 
are those “susceptible of increasing the cost of labor” (TCU Eurostat, 2014, p.273). 
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including cigarettes, while remaining exogenous to illicit-demand shocks since neither is affected directly 
by changes in cigarette prices. It is common to instrument cigarette prices with excise taxes (e.g., 
Gruber, Sen, & Stabile, 2003; Stehr, 2005; Nonnemaker et al., 2009). The cigarette-specific tax 
instrument we construct, ExTaxHypo, is the total excise tax (in real euros) that would be levied on a 
cigarette with pre-tax price equal to the average in the sample. Excise taxes on cigarettes in the EU 
consist of a fixed amount per pack (the “specific” tax, SpecTax) and an ad valorem component (AVtax). 
Details of the calculation are in the appendix. ExTaxHypo is calculated based on a constant pre-tax price 
for all observations to avoid endogeneity from using the actual, potentially endogenous prices in the 
formula. While this instrument has a strong claim to exogeneity, it may in fact be partly endogenous if 
the fixed component of cigarette taxes, SpecTax, is adjusted by the authorities in some fashion 
depending on actual price levels or if cigarette taxes are endogenously lowered in response to 
smuggling, which appears to be at most the rare exception across Europe (as shown in the appendix). 
For this reason, we perform IV regression both with and without instrument ExTaxHypo. When prices 
are in logs, this instrument is, too. 
The three instruments labortax, VATrate, and log ExTaxHypo are positively correlated with log 
real cigarette prices (the correlation is 0.31, 0.16, and 0.74, resp.). In the first-stage regression of log 
prices on the instruments and the exogenous regressors, the coefficients for the instruments are all 
positive as expected (see Table 8). The instruments appear to be reasonably strong. The F statistic on 
the excluded instruments is 10.26 when only labortax and VATrate are included and 18.40 when 
ExTaxHypo is added. The advantage of having multiple instruments available is that overidentification 
tests can be performed on the exogeneity of the instruments. The Sargan-Hansen statistic has a p-value 
of 0.38 in the former regression and 0.57 in the latter, and so the tests fail to find any evidence that the 
instruments are invalid due to endogeneity. 
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The second-stage results are in Table 7, labeled IV 7.1 (when the instruments are labortax and 
VATrate) and IV 7.2 (when all three instruments are included). As expected, when the downward bias 
from endogeneity is removed, the price coefficient rises. Note, however, that the 95% confidence 
intervals on the price coefficients are wide enough to include the estimate from FE 7.2. The price 
coefficients of 0.371 to 0.386 imply that a 10% increase in cigarette prices (for example, due to tax 
increases) causes illicit market share to rise by about 3.7 to 3.9 percentage points. At the mean illicit 
share, that would be an increase from 10.0% of the market to 13.7–13.9%. Stated another way, the 10% 
increase in cigarette prices would lead to a 37 to 39% increase in illicit market share. The implied 
elasticity of illicit market share with respect to real cigarette prices is 7.4 to 8.0. These appear to be 
sizable effects.36 
2. The separate impact of cigarette prices and taxes 
In theory, consumers should not care about the components of the cigarette price, just the out-
of-pocket total price. However, we now explore including taxes directly in the regression specifications 
for three reasons. First, the policy question has most directly to do with the impact of raising taxes. 
Second, some previous studies disaggregated the tax components of the price (e.g., Coats, 1995; 
Goolsbee, Lovenheim, & Slemrod, 2010). Finally, even though consumers may not be sensitive to the 
division of retail price into tax and other components, suppliers of illicit cigarettes probably are. Taxes 
can be fully avoided by illicit supply, whereas the non-tax part of the price reflects in part local cost 
conditions that may affect illicit traffickers as well. For the latter reason, if any difference in impacts is to 
be found, we expect that taxes have more impact on IRTC than the non-tax part of the final price.  
                                                          
36 Due to limited availability of some of the instruments, the sample sizes in estimations IV 7.1 and 7.2 are lower 
than in the first two columns of Table 9. The increased price coefficients are not merely due to composition bias 
from the changed sample. If FE 7.2 is re-estimated using the IV samples, the price coefficients remain close to the 
original 0.162, at 0.176 and 0.215. 
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Since CigPrice = Ppre-excise-tax + ExTax, a linear additive specification is appropriate for the 
regressions. Therefore we switch to using price and tax levels instead of logs. In estimation FE 9.1 (Table 
9), we first re-run the specification from FE 7.2 but with the price in levels instead of logs. The coefficient 
is not directly comparable to those in the previous tables due to switching away from the linear-log 
specification, but it is highly significant as before. The price coefficient of 0.685 means that a one euro 
cent increase in the cigarette price per stick would lead to an expected increase of 0.69 percentage 
points in illicit market share. That is a sizeable effect: the implied average price elasticity of illicit market 
share in the sample is 2.74. 
Separating the total price into its components yields estimation FE 9.2. The first regressor is the 
price including VAT but excluding ad valorem and specific excise taxes on tobacco, and the second 
regressor is the total excise tax per stick. The results show that if a distinction is to be made between 
tobacco-specific taxes and the rest of the price, then taxes are more important, both numerically and in 
terms of significance. An increase of 1 euro cent in the tax per stick is associated with a statistically 
significant increase of 1.3 percentage points in illicit market share. The implied tax elasticity of illicit 
market share is 2.9, which is similar to the total-price elasticities from FE 7.1 and 7.2. On the other hand, 
the non-tax part of the price has a smaller, insignificant coefficient, with an associated elasticity of 0.71. 
Instrumenting the price with the labortax and VATrate (estimation IV 9.1, also in Table 9) does not 
change the insignificance of the price coefficient, although it increases its size. When the tax variable is 
also treated as endogenous (estimation IV 9.2), results are similar.37 
Switching from the linear-log specification in the previous section to the fully linear specification 
here increases the chance that outliers in prices or taxes unduly influence the estimates. To investigate 
                                                          
37 Additional instruments used for the excise tax are ExTaxHypo and an index of fiscal freedom from various years 
of the Index of Economic Freedom published by the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation (see 
heritage.org/index/about). The latter variable takes lower values the higher the general tax burden in a country.  
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this possibility, the extra terms in a quadratic expansion in the tax and the rest of the price variables are 
added to estimation FE 9.3.38 The results indicate that the average marginal effect of taxes is 1.71 (p-
value = 0.02), compared to the linear coefficient of 1.41 from the otherwise comparable estimation FE 
9.2; prices and taxes are still jointly significant (p-value = 0.02). Coefficients on the higher-order terms 
are not jointly significant (p-value = 0.43) and therefore do not appear to be necessary. 
3. Impact of IRTC-relevant factors in other countries 
The factors explored in section A.2 above, those involving price differentials and distances to 
other countries with lower prices, etc., exhibit most of their variation in the cross-section rather than 
the time series. For example, if the same other country has the lower price during the sample 
timeframe, then the variables for LowPrDistEU and LowPrDistNonEU will show no within-country 
variation. Variable CChubDist never varies within country. Thus these variables are less useful once fixed 
effects are added to the model, and even when they do vary over time the amount of variation is likely 
too small to estimate the coefficients precisely. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness we repeat 
the estimations in Table 6 with the fixed-effects specification. The results (not shown) indicate that none 
of the additional variables have significant coefficients at the 5% level (although in two of the four 
regressions the other-country variables are jointly significant at that level). 
4. Impact of licit price on illicit quantities 
The preceding sections have established that raising prices or taxes on cigarettes increases the 
market share of illicit cigarettes by an appreciable amount. We turn now to Claim 3: is it the case that 
the results above are misleading, because higher prices merely shrink the denominator in the calculation 
                                                          
38 Since log price was the original regressor, this procedure can be formally justified as a second-order expansion 
(using Taylor’s Rule) of the function log 𝑝𝑝 = log(𝑎𝑎 + 𝐼𝐼), where p is the total price, t is the tax per stick, and r is the 
rest of the price.  
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of illicit share instead of actually increasing the volume of IRTC? To investigate, we repeat the 
estimations from Table 7 with the new dependent variable of illicit quantities instead of shares. In 
particular, the dependent variable is the log of IllicitQty, the quantity of illicit cigarette. Note that 
differences in the population of countries are largely absorbed into the country fixed effects, and in any 
event the log-log specification implies that impacts are in percentage terms.39 
The results, shown in Table 10, demonstrate that the results above are not merely a “misleading 
math trick” or “sleight of hand” (to use the phrases of Stoklosa (2015)). First, note that the sign and 
significance levels of the price coefficients in the new estimations in Table 10 are the same as the 
corresponding regressions in Table 7. Also, note that the size of the impact is not small. The log-log 
specification implies that the price coefficients, which range from 0.75 to 2.5, are elasticities. These 
elasticities imply that, at the sample average price of €0.186/stick, a 10% price increase would be 
associated with an increase in illicit cigarettes sold of 7.5% to 25.4%. At the sample average of 2.524B 
illicit sticks/year within a country, those figures represent between 190M and 641M additional illicit 
cigarettes traded per year per country on average. 
C. Robustness checks 
This section contains several robustness checks to confirm the main conclusions of the previous 
estimations. First, weighted estimates are compared with the unweighted estimates above. Next, 
alternative measures of illicit trade are explored. Finally, various alternative regressors for prices and 
measures of corruption and the rule of law are employed. Out of the 16 additional estimations 
performed here, and several more in the appendix, only one fails to concur with our main findings that 
                                                          
39 If the dependent variable is changed to the log of illicit quantity divided by the number of persons of legal 
smoking age in the country, the coefficients are similar in magnitude to those from estimations FE 10.1 and 10.2 
and the significance levels are identical. 
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Claims 1b and 2 are false. In the single exception (noted below), the sign of the price coefficient is also 
against Claim 1b but a lack of strong instruments leads to its insignificance. 
1. Weighted estimation 
Some researchers use weighted least squares (WLS) to improve the efficiency of cross-country  
regressions.  The difference between the unweighted and WLS estimates can then also be used as a 
diagnostic for model misspecification (i.e., misspecification of the conditional mean by not including 
relevant regressors or through incorrect functional form; Solon, Haider, & Wooldridge, 2015).40 In 
estimation FE 11.1 in Table 11, estimation FE 7.2 is repeated using the number of persons of legal 
smoking age (data from Euromonitor) as weights. The results show that even though the price 
coefficient is a bit smaller than in FE 7.2, it has a higher significance level. Given the relatively small 
difference in price coefficients compared to the size of the standard errors, there is no strong evidence 
that WLS estimation is needed to correct bias in the unweighted estimations. 
2. Alternative measures of illicit trade 
The Euromonitor data on IRTC, although widely used, are not the only comprehensive data on 
illicit cigarettes available for Europe. Since 2006, the UK consulting firm KPMG LLP has estimated IRTC 
for the EU in its series of Project Star and Project Sun reports. The reports are funded by Philip Morris 
International, the largest producer of cigarettes in Europe (and the world).41 Despite the fact that the 
KPMG estimates of illicit trade are used by the European Commission and national governments, their 
                                                          
40 If the regression specification for the mean is correct, then WLS and unweighted estimation are both consistent 
and employing weights should not materially change the results. 
41 See Gilmore et al. (2014) for background on the litigation leading PMI to fund the reports for the EU. The earlier 
reports are not publicly available; we examined copies under arrangement from Altria Client Services. Data from 
the reports on the volume of contraband and counterfeit cigarettes consumed by country (2006-2013), however, 
are reproduced in Table 1 of the annex to Transcrime (2015), available at transcrime.it/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Methodological-Annex.pdf. 
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accuracy is contested by some tobacco-control researchers (e.g., Gilmore et al., 2014). Since these data 
have been criticized for being provided under contract to the tobacco industry, we do not rely on them 
for our main estimations, notwithstanding the fact that Transcrime (2015) states that “despite the 
concerns raised by the literature, KPMG data are the best available data on the illicit cigarette market in 
the EU” and “…the national estimates produced by Project Star and Project Sun are at present the most 
reliable sources….”42 However, these alternative data can be used to provide additional corroborating 
evidence for our main conclusions. 
The new dependent variable is the share of counterfeit and contraband consumption out of 
total consumption, as for the variable IllicitMktShare used above.43 The new variable is highly but not 
perfectly correlated (r = 0.78) with IllicitMktShare from the Euromonitor data, which shows that the 
latter data do not rely solely on data from the industry-funded Project Sun/Star. The estimations here 
employ price data from the KPMG reports as well, instead of the prices from Euromonitor.44 The 
repetition of the main estimations (FE 7.2, IV 7.1, and IV 7.2) from Table 7 with the illicit market share 
and price data from KPMG yields the analogous estimations reported in Table 11. In estimations FE 11.2 
and IV 11.1, the price coefficients are significant and even larger than in the similar estimations using 
the Euromonitor data. These results thus strengthen the conclusions found above. The price coefficient 
from IV 11.2, however, is positive but not significant, perhaps due to the lower strength of the 
instruments here (as shown by comparing the first-stage F statistics between the two tables).  
                                                          
42 Transcrime (2015) goes on to assert that estimates of IRTC independent from the tobacco industry are based on 
smaller samples, rely on surveys that have underreporting biases, and are not available annually. 
43 KPMG defines contraband as genuine branded cigarettes that have been bought in a low-tax country and which 
exceed legal border limits or were acquired without taxes for export purposes to be illegally resold in a higher 
priced market. Contraband includes small scale (bootlegging) and wholesale (organized crime) smuggling. Cheap 
whites are also included in estimates of contraband and counterfeit product. 
44 Given that the correlation between the price variables from the two sources is 0.986, it makes little difference to 
the results which is used in the regressions here. 
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We also explore a third measure of IRTC. To complement the estimations using the Euromonitor 
and KPMG data, we calculated our own estimates of illicit market share. Our consumption gap analysis 
has the advantage of avoiding industry- and third-party estimates of IRTC that lack completely 
transparent methodology. Following the approach suggested by Blecher (2010), we compare survey 
estimates of total cigarette consumption within each country to the amount of licit sales and ascribe 
gaps between the two to consumption of illicitly obtained cigarettes. Construction of the data and the 
analysis contains many steps, which are detailed in the appendix. The results, also in the appendix, 
provide further evidence that licit cigarette prices have sizeable and statistically significant positive 
impacts on illicit market share. The marginal effects of price on IRTC by this method are estimated to be 
somewhat larger than our main results above, although the appendix discusses why there may be some 
upward bias. 
3. Alternative regressors 
The European Commission collects data on cigarette prices and taxes that can be used as 
alternatives to the data from Euromonitor. Details on these data are in the appendix. Using this 
alternative source, the variable CigPrice and the instruments VAT and ExTaxHypo are reconstructed and 
employed in regressions similar to FE 7.2, IV 7.1, and IV 7.2. The results are in Table 12. In all 
estimations, the price coefficients are similar in magnitude and significance to the analogous estimations 
in Table 7, except that the coefficient has a higher level of significance in estimation FE 12.1 than in FE 
7.2.  
Finally, there are many other control variables that can be used in place of the particular 
measure of corruption employed above. Our conclusions, particularly those regarding Claim 2, should 
not rest only on one specific corruption measure. Accordingly, we repeat estimation OLS 4.3 with 
several other regressors in place of NotCorrupt. The alternatives include corruption measures from 
Transparency International, indices of a country’s rule of law and the effectiveness of government from 
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the World Bank, and United Nations data on police per capita. See the appendix for information on 
these variables.  
The results, in Table 13, are virtually identical to OLS 4.3. Claim 2 is rejected in each regression, 
whether the alternative regressors are included singly or jointly (the latter in estimation OLS 13.6): none 
of the alternative measures are statistically significant, while the coefficient on price remains highly 
significant.45 Furthermore, the size of the price coefficient is essentially the same as that found in 
estimation OLS 4.3, ranging only from 0.10 to 0.11. When two-way fixed-effects regressions similar to FE 
7.2 are estimated with these alternatives to NotCorrupt, the results (see Table 14) again are in accord 
with Claim 2 and the price coefficient remains significant and changes little. 
V. Policy discussion and conclusions 
Table 15 summarizes the results of the various regressions. The elasticities are generally large, 
ranging from 3.3 to 8.0 for illicit share and from 0.8 to 2.5 for illicit quantity. In all cases for the latter, 
the confidence interval for the elasticity admits the elastic region (greater than one), indicating that IRTC 
is highly responsive to licit cigarette prices.46 The table also shows the estimated effects of €1/pack tax 
increase within a single country. A regression with country and year fixed effects (and no other 
regressors; results not shown) shows that a €1/pack tax increase may be expected to raise prices by 
€1.13/pack on average. Remarkably similar tax pass-through rates for cigarettes were also found in US 
markets by Keeler et al. (1996) and Sullivan and Dutkowsky (2012); pass-through was 1.11 in the former 
study and 1.07 to 1.14 in the latter. Our estimate is also between the bounding estimates of Delipalla 
                                                          
45 Results for the index on government effectiveness are not shown in the tables since they are nearly identical to 
those for the index on the rule of law. 
46 It is well known that the price elasticity for cigarette consumption is inelastic. The elasticity reported here, 
however, is a cross-price elasticity (from licit prices to illicit sales). 
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and O’Donnell (2001) for cigarette tax pass-through in European markets.47 That price increase, coupled 
with the fitted models in Table 7 and Table 10, allows calculation of the expected change in illicit market 
share or illicit cigarette quantities. 
The estimates are calculated as the average of the discrete changes in the dependent variable in 
the sample. For the market share, the estimated change due to the price increase for a country and year 
is 
Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
and the average discrete change is 
𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁(Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) = 𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁(Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁 denotes the (unweighted) empirical average operator. For the illicit quantity, the calculation is 
more involved since the dependent variable is in logs. Assuming the error term in the regressions for log 
quantity is normally distributed with variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 conditional on the regressors, the estimated change in 
quantity from the price change is 
Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = exp �𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀22 � − exp�𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀22 � 
where 𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes the regressor vector after the price change and 𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is before.
48 Since the only 
element of x that changes is the price, the expression on the right can be written 
Δ𝐸𝐸(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = exp�𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀22 � �exp�𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� − 1� 
                                                          
47 These authors split their sample into a group comprising Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, and 
UK, which had ad valorem pass-through of 0.7 and specific-excise pass-through of 0.9, and a second group 
containing France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, which had ad valorem pass-through of 1.5 and 
specific-excise pass-through of 2.2. Our total excise pass-through estimate of 1.1 lies within these bounds, as 
would be expected due to averaging across countries and tax types. 
48 The expression follows from the formula for the mean of a lognormally distributed random variable. 
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Again, the average discrete change is calculated as the empirical average of the above expression. 
Asymptotic standard errors for these estimates are calculated via the delta method. 
The price increase is associated with an expected 5 percentage points of illicit market share from 
the fixed-effects regression (see the first two rows of Table 15). This is a large increase when compared 
to the average illicit share of 10.1% in the sample. If the IV regression estimates are used instead for the 
calculations, the implied impact is between 11 and 12 percentage points. The price increase is estimated 
from the fixed-effects regressions to lead to additional illicit sales of between 620 and 647 million 
cigarettes within a country and year; the IV estimates are an additional 2.4 to 3.0 billion sticks. Again, 
these are large impacts compared to the average illicit volume of 2.5 billion sticks—increases of 25% to 
120% of the average. 
In conclusion, we find that while the overall correlation between licit cigarette prices and illicit 
market share is negative, raising prices in any one country would lead, ceteris paribus, to substantial 
increases in the expected illicit market share and volume. The role of prices in stimulating IRTC is far 
more empirically important than that of corruption, at least in the European data examined here. 
Finally, the same general conclusions about the importance and impact of prices on IRTC hold whether 
examining illicit market shares or illicit volumes. 
How can it be that Claim 1a is true but Claim 1b is false? Such “sign reversal” of a coefficient is 
familiar to researchers working with panel data in which unobserved unit-specific factors are likely to 
cause severe bias. The present data exhibit the well-known Simpson’s Paradox: a trend that appears in 
different groups of data can disappear or be reversed in the aggregate. The latter is Claim 1a; the former 
is Claim 1b. There is no actual paradox, once the distinction between causality and mere correlation is 
made (Pearl, 2009, ch. 6). 
This analysis addresses only one consideration in determining how cigarettes should be taxed. 
The econometric results are for the expected impacts on illicit trade of raising prices while holding all 
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else fixed, and do not speak to direct or indirect effects of other policy measures that may accompany 
taxation. Policymakers need not (and should not) leave enforcement and other activity designed to 
further compliance unchanged if they intend to increase taxes. It is also important to note that the 
impacts of raising prices that we estimate are for a country unilaterally raising its tax. Since the work 
above showed that price differentials among countries affect IRTC, raising or lowering prices to 
harmonize them across the EU would not necessarily lead to similar changes in illicit activity. In any case, 
the impact on illicit trade is only one aspect of policy analysis of increasing cigarette prices. A complete 
cost-benefit analysis of tax policy toward tobacco would include the expected impacts on tax revenue 
and public health in addition to the unintended consequences examined here. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Countries and years included in the data 
Country First year Last year 
Austria 1999 2013 
Belgium 1999 2013 
Bulgaria 2007 2013 
Croatia 2013 2013 
Czech Republic 2004 2013 
Denmark 1999 2013 
Estonia 2004 2013 
Finland 2000 2013 
France 1999 2013 
Germany 1999 2013 
Greece 1999 2013 
Hungary 2004 2013 
Ireland 1999 2013 
Country First year Last year 
Italy 1999 2013 
Latvia 2004 2013 
Lithuania 2004 2013 
Netherlands 1999 2013 
Poland 2004 2013 
Portugal 1999 2013 
Romania 2007 2013 
Slovakia 2004 2013 
Slovenia 2004 2013 
Spain 1999 2013 
Sweden 2000 2013 
United Kingdom 1999 2013 
 
Note: not all years appear in all estimation, due to missing values of regressors or (in the case of Croatia) 
the inclusion of fixed effects. 
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Table 2: Variables and definitions 
Variable Name Definition Source 
IllicitMktShare illicit market share EM 
IllicitQty illicit cigarette quantity (M sticks) EM 
CigPrice cigarette price per stick, calculated as average revenue EM 
PriceLessTax cigarette price per stick, not including excise tax EM 
ExTaxHypo hypothetical excise tax EM 
LaborTax total revenue from taxes on employed labor income as a 
percentage of GDP 
TCU Eurostat (2014) 
FiscalFreedom index of fiscal freedom from the Index of Economic 
Freedom 
Heritage Foundation 
VAT general VAT as a percentage of retail sales price EM 
SpecTax specific excise tax per stick EM 
AVtax ad valorem excise tax rate on cigarettes, as a percentage 
of retail sales price 
EM 
ExTax excise tax on cigarettes per stick (does not include VAT) EM 
LowPrDistEU the distance (in 1000 km) to the closest EU country with 
a lower cigarette price. 
Authors’ calculations 
LowPrDistNonEU the distance (in 1000 km) to the closest country outside 
the EU with a lower real average cigarette price 
Authors’ calculations 
CChubDist The distance (in 1000 km) to the closest major hub for 
contraband and counterfeit cigarettes in Europe: Russia, 
Turkey, or the Northeast Criminal Hub of Lithuania, 
Estonia, Latvia, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad 
Authors’ calculations 
MaxPdiff the maximum difference in cigarette prices between the 
home country and contiguous countries 
Authors’ calculations 
MinPratio the minimum over all contiguous countries of the ratio of 
the other country’s price to the home country’s price 
Authors’ calculations 
MaxPdiffKM the maximum price difference per km between the home 
country and any other country included in the dataset 
Authors’ calculations 
GNIpc gross national income (GNI; Atlas method) per capita 
(€1,000) 
World Bank WGI 
NotCorrupt control of corruption, an index measuring “perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private 
interests” (the index ranges from -2.5 [weak governance] 
to 2.5 [strong governance]). 
World Bank WGI 
Note: all monetary amounts are converted to real 2010 euros. 
 39 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean S.d. Min Max 
IllicitMktShare 302 0.101 0.091 0.004 0.538 
IllicitQty 302 2,524.4 2,827.5 5.000 14,828.0 
Log(IllicitQty) 302 7.171 1.263 4.043 9.604 
CigPrice 302 0.186 0.084 0.056 0.464 
Log(CigPrice) 302 -1.778 0.435 -2.882 -0.768 
PriceLessTax 262 0.075 0.034 0.006 0.196 
ExTaxHypo 262 0.075 0.042 0.019 0.233 
LaborTax 266 16.767 4.202 9.031 26.893 
FiscalFreedom 302 59.917 16.367 29.000 9.000 
VAT 288 16.963 1.679 1.000 21.000 
SpecTax 262 0.050 0.048 0.004 0.227 
AVtax 263 33.165 15.109 0.000 6.000 
ExTax 302 0.109 0.054 0.017 0.284 
LowPrDistEU 287 0.479 0.537 0.065 3.610 
LowPrDistNonEU 302 0.587 0.372 0.065 2.450 
CChubDist 302 1.130 0.779 0.088 3.270 
MaxPdiff 301 0.070 0.063 -0.094 0.243 
MinPratio 301 0.589 0.325 0.109 1.376 
MaxPdiffKM 302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
GNIpc 302 22.792 11.482 1.719 47.120 
NotCorrupt 302 1.182 0.832 -0.304 2.586 
Data cover years 1999 to 2013; some years are unavailable for some variables. 
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Table 4: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices 
 OLS 4.1 OLS 4.2 OLS 4.3 
Y = illicit market share Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Log(real cigarette price) -0.050 -0.002 0.098 
 (0.037) (0.039) (0.032)*** 
Freedom from Corruption 
(WGI) 
 -0.039 -0.007 
  (0.019)** (0.015) 
Income (GNI) per capita 
(€1,000) 
  -0.019 
   (0.005)*** 
GNI per capita squared   0.000 
   (0.000)*** 
constant 0.012 0.144 0.534 
 (0.065) (0.086) (0.109)*** 
F statistic 1.80 2.97 5.44 
R2 0.057 0.133 0.332 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.127 0.323 
N 302 302 302 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
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Table 5: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on other-country IRTC-relevant variables 
 OLS 5.1 OLS 5.2 OLS 5.3 OLS 5.4 OLS 5.5 OLS 5.6 OLS 5.7 
Y = illicit market share Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.091 0.115 0.115 0.080 0.081 0.095 0.097 
 (0.032)*** (0.031)*** (0.034)*** (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.030)*** (0.028)*** 
Distance to closest EU -0.035       
country with lower price (0.011)***       
Distance to closest non-EU  -0.043      
country with lower price  (0.023)*      
Distance to closest    -0.025     
smuggling area   (0.012)*     
Max. price difference with     0.258    
contiguous countries (X1)    (0.137)*    
Max. price difference     0.586   
(X1) below its median     (0.277)**   
Max. price diff. (X1) between its      -0.368   
median and 90th percentile     (0.493)   
Max. price diff. (X1) above its      0.802   
90th percentile     (0.435)*   
Minimum ratio: other contiguous      -0.056  
country price ÷ own price      (0.032)*  
Max. price difference/KM       66.682 
       (27.686)** 
Freedom from Corruption  0.003 -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 0.000 -0.008 -0.020 
(WGI) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017) 
Income (GNI) per capita  -0.020 -0.021 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.020 
(€1,000) (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
constant 0.547 5.66 0.581 0.470 0.456 0.538 0.528 
 (0.115)*** 0.352 (0.118)*** (0.101)*** (0.106)*** (0.106)*** (0.093)*** 
F 4.15 0.341 4.54 4.50 8.66 4.52 6.25 
R^2 0.375  0.368 0.361 0.377 0.367 0.377 
Adjusted R^2 0.364  0.357 0.350 0.362 0.356 0.366 
N 287 302 302 301 301 301 302 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
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Table 6: Additional Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on other-country IRTC-relevant variables 
 OLS 3.1 OLS 3.2 OLS 3.3 OLS 3.4 
Y = illicit market share Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.079 0.084 0.100 0.101 
 (0.043)* (0.040)** (0.023)*** (0.027)*** 
Distance to closest EU country with -0.031 -0.034 -0.030 -0.035 
lower price (0.012)** (0.011)*** (0.013)** (0.011)*** 
Distance to closest non-EU country with 0.014 0.017   
lower price (0.050) (0.048)   
Distance to closest smuggling area   -0.015 -0.011 
   (0.014) (0.016) 
Max. price difference with contiguous 0.131  0.022  
countries (X1) below its median (0.282)  (0.333)  
Max. price diff. (X1) between its  -0.330  -0.519  
median and 90th percentile (0.550)  (0.480)  
Max. price diff. (X1) above its  0.753  0.981  
90th percentile (0.431)*  (0.421)**  
Minimum ratio: other contiguous country’s  -0.004  0.020 
price ÷ home country price  (0.046)  (0.042) 
Maximum price difference/KM 73.389 71.191 65.407 64.642 
 (30.507)** (35.014)* (31.829)* (36.316)* 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.021 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
_cons 0.495 0.518 0.564 0.567 
 (0.140)*** (0.125)*** (0.106)*** (0.106)*** 
F (all regressors) 5.76 3.33 6.40 3.68 
R^2 0.426 0.418 0.432 0.420 
Adjusted R^2 0.405 0.401 0.411 0.403 
N 287 287 287 287 
P-value for H0: all other-country coefficients are zero 0.0050 0.0302 0.0022 0.0189 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 7: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices 
Y = illicit market share FE 7.1 FE 7.2 IV 7.1 IV 7.2 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.164 0.162 0.386 0.371 
 (0.061)** (0.083)* (0.140)*** (0.143)*** 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) 0.022 0.010 -0.014 -0.002 
 (0.028) (0.041) (0.052) (0.044) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.001 0.006 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N Y Y Y 
Weighted estimation N N N N 
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments   10.26 20.13 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)   0.381 0.597 
N 302 302 263 238 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: In estimation IV 7.1, the instruments for price are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 7.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also used. 
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Table 8: First-stage regressions for the IV regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices 
Y = Log(real cigarette price) IV 7.1, 1st stage IV 7.2, 1st stage 
VAT 0.053 0.039 
 (0.014)*** (0.011)*** 
LaborTax 0.025 0.037 
 (0.015) (0.013)*** 
ExTaxHypo  0.326 
  (0.059)*** 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) -0.014 -0.002 
 (0.052) (0.044) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 263 238 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: Both estimations include country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 9: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices and taxes 
Y = illicit market share FE 9.1 FE 9.2 IV 9.1 IV 9.2 FE 9.3 
Real cigarette price, including tax 0.685     
(0.242)***     
Real cigarette price, not including 
excise tax 
 0.467 1.022 1.287 0.140 
 (0.412) (0.952) (0.814) (0.882) 
Real excise tax per stick  1.342 1.159 1.212 2.134 
  (0.491)** (0.547)** (0.589)** (1.871) 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) 0.017 0.021 0.028 0.025 0.023 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Real cigarette price, not including 
excise tax, squared 
    -11.582 
    (11.594) 
Real excise tax per stick, squared     -8.285 
    (10.798) 
(Cigarette price w/o excise 
tax)×(excise tax per stick) 
    17.725 
    (17.958) 
Joint test of all price & tax 
coefficients (p-value) 
    0.0273 
Joint test of price & tax higher-order 
coefficients (p-value) 
    0.6840 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
N 302 262 238 238 262 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: In estimation IV 9.1, the instruments for price are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 9.2 the tax is also treated as 
endogenous and instruments ExTaxHypo and FiscalFreedom are also used. 
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Table 10: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC quantities on cigarette prices  
Y = log illicit cigarette qty FE 10.1 FE 10.2 IV 10.1 IV 10.2 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.780 0.752 2.538 2.214 
 (0.325)** (0.405)* (0.930)*** (0.636)*** 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) 0.067 -0.046 -0.279 -0.287 
 (0.251) (0.368) (0.473) (0.376) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.044 0.095 -0.016 0.017 
 (0.026) (0.047)* (0.073) (0.072) 
GNI per capita squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects N Y Y Y 
N 302 302 263 238 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SEs (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: In estimation IV 10.1, the instruments for price are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 10.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also 
used. 
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Table 11: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (WLS and alternative dependent variable) 
Y = illicit market share FE 11.1 FE 11.2 IV 11.1 IV 11.2 
Source for dependent variable: Euromonitor KPMG KPMG KPMG 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.120 0.216 0.478 0.257 
 (0.027)*** (0.104)** (0.205)** (0.176) 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) -0.005 -0.003 -0.041 -0.009 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.056) (0.045) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.008 -0.000 -0.010 -0.002 
 (0.004)** (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Weighted least squares estimation Y N N N 
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments   4.23 10.1 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)   0.274 0.150 
N 302 166 166 166 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: In estimation FE 11.1, the observations are weighted with the legal smoking population. In estimation IV 11.1, the instruments for price 
are LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 11.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also used. All estimations include country and year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 12: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative price and tax data from the European 
Commission) 
Y = illicit market share FE 12.1 IV 12.1 IV 12.2 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.187 0.403 0.348 
 (0.087)** (0.123)*** (0.108)*** 
Freedom from Corruption (WGI) 0.026 0.015 0.021 
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.048) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.001 -0.015 -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000) 
1st stage F statistic on excluded instruments  7.37 19.39 
Sargan-Hansen statistic (p-value)  0.242 0.332 
N 303 266 266 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: Data from the European Commission for price and taxes are used in these estimations. In estimation IV 12.1, the instruments for price are 
LaborTax and VAT as described in the text; in IV 12.2 instrument ExTaxHypo is also used. All estimations include country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 13: Pooled OLS regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative corruption and rule of law regressors) 
  OLS 13.1 OLS 13.2 OLS 13.3 OLS 13.4 OLS 13.5 OLS 13.6 
Y = illicit market share Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.099 0.099 0.098 0.108 0.114 0.112 
 (0.039)** (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.036)*** (0.035)*** (0.040)*** 
Corruption Perceptions Index (TPI) 0.000     -0.001 
 (0.001)     (0.001) 
Corruption Rank (TPI)  -0.073    0.073 
  (0.080)    (0.169) 
Rule of Law (WGI)   0.024   0.084 
   (0.019)   (0.053) 
Police per 100,000 people    -2.47E-05 -2.15E-04 6.54E-05 
    (8.47E-05) (2.29E-04) (1.22E-04) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) -0.017 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
GNI per capita squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
constant 0.515 0.566 0.532 0.572 0.589 -0.022 
 (0.133)*** (0.113)*** (0.100)*** (0.115)*** (0.114)*** (0.005)*** 
Year fixed effects Y N N N N Y 
F statistic 2.96 5.98 6.53 6.52 6.39 25.12 
R2 0.383 0.335 0.338 0.365 0.377 0.455 
Adjusted R2 0.344 0.326 0.330 0.355 0.367 0.410 
N 302 302 302 263 249 263 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
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Table 14: Fixed-effects panel regressions of IRTC share on cigarette prices (alternative corruption and rule of law regressors) 
 FE 14.1 FE 14.2 FE 14.3 FE 14.4 FE 14.5 FE 14.6 
Y = illicit market share Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) Coef. (se) 
Log(real cigarette price) 0.164 0.185 0.162 0.209 0.212 0.210 
 (0.078)** (0.083)** (0.076)** (0.086)** (0.086)** (0.087)** 
Corruption Perceptions Index (TPI) -0.001     -0.000 
 (0.001)     (0.001) 
Corruption Rank (TPI)  0.203    0.152 
  (0.132)    (0.164) 
Rule of Law (WGI)   0.024   0.086 
   (0.055)   (0.051) 
Police per 100,000 people    -2.07E-04 -2.05E-04 -2.01E-04 
    (2.21E-04) (2.04E-04) (2.06E-04) 
Income (GNI) per capita (€1,000) 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.000 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GNI per capita squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F statistic 10.81 5.43 6.45 3.55 3.09 3.17 
R2 (within) 0.311 0.322 0.309 0.359 0.344 0.377 
Adjusted R2 (within) 0.267 0.279 0.265 0.314 0.296 0.326 
N 302 302 302 263 249 263 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; SE’s (in parentheses) account for clustering by country. 
Note: All estimations include country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 15 Estimated impact of a 1€/pack tax increase 
 Illicit share  Price 
Coefficient 
 Elasticity  Increase in illicit share 
Estimation Average in  
sample 
 Significance 
level 
 Point estimate 
(average in 
sample) 
95% confidence 
interval 
 Point estimate 
(average in 
sample) 
95% confidence 
interval 
FE 7.1 0.101  **  3.38 [0.77, 6.00]  0.050 [0.011, 0.089] 
FE 7.2 0.101  *  3.33 [-0.21, 6.87]  0.049 [-0.003, 0.102] 
IV 7.1 0.101  ***  8.04 [2.32, 13.77]  0.118 [0.034, 0.202] 
IV 7.2 0.101  ***  7.38 [1.82, 12.93]  0.114 [0.028, 0.199] 
          
 Illicit quantity       Increase in illicit quantity 
FE 10.1 2,524.4  **  0.78 [0.11, 1.45]  646.6 [44.2, 1249.0] 
FE 10.2 2,524.4  *  0.75 [-.08, 1.59]  620.2 [-123.9, 1364.2] 
IV 10.1 2,524.4  ***  2.54 [0.72, 4.36]  2,977.0 [-316.9, 6270.8] 
IV 10.2 2,524.4  ***  2.21 [0.97, 3.46]  2,425.3 [434.0, 4416.6] 
 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Estimated market share of illicit trade in cigarettes 
 
Notes: Data from Euromonitor. Market share is in terms of quantities of cigarettes. 
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Figure 2. Estimated volume of illicit European trade in cigarettes 
 
Notes: Data from Euromonitor. Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom; Eastern Europe includes Belarus, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
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Figure 3: Cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 2013 
 
Notes: Variables constructed using source data from Euromonitor as described in the text. Currency units are 2010 euros.  
AUT
BEL
BGR
HRV
CZE
DNK
EST
FRA
DEU
GRC
IRL
LVA
LTU
NLD
PRT
SVN
SWE
GBR
FIN
POL
ITA
SVK
ESP
HUN
ROM
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Ill
ic
it 
re
ta
il 
tra
de
 in
 c
ig
ar
et
te
s 
(IR
TC
), 
sh
ar
e
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Average cigarette price per stick, €
 55 
 
 
Figure 4: Cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 2000-2013 
 
Notes: The line of best fit is calculated via OLS regression. See also notes to Figure 3. 
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Figure 5: Country-demeaned cigarette prices and IRTC shares in the EU, 2000-2013 
  
Note: For each country, the average of the time-series of each variable has been subtracted from the data. The line of best fit (slope = 0.83) is 
calculated via OLS regression. See also notes to Figure 3. 
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Figure 6: Cigarette prices and taxes in the EC, 2000-2013 
 
Notes: The line of best fit is calculated via OLS regression (R2 = 0.954). See also notes to Figure 3. 
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Figure 7: Cigarette prices and illicit market share in the EC, 1999-2013 
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